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The problems of nation-building are anything but new in Africa. The 
new cities of Africa have the same influence in nation-building as cities 
have nad in other parts of the world, but some of these nations which 
have eeen born under less fortunate conditions will find the achievement 
of nationalism and ethnic integration a very difficult task as is the case 
in Nigeria. 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, and achieved her 
independence in 1960 from British colonial rule. Geographically, socially 
and culturally it is a multi-national society. Its colonial history, its 
present problems and its future prospects and potentialities are in many 
respects typical of those of other African countries. However, Nigeria 
has in many other respects been distinguished by certain characteristic 
features which set it apart from other countries and make it of special 
interest and appeal. Among these was the peculiar set-up by Britain of 
the three regional governments with total control of these regions by each 
of the three main ethnic groups. 
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Unfortunately, Britain did little to reconcile these varied politi¬ 
cal cultures in order to create an integrated Nigerian nation. The 
Richards Constitution of 1946 attempted to promote Nigerian unity, but it 
did not provide adequate political representation for the whole country. 
Furthermore, the impact of westernization was not felt equally by all 
tribal groups. Nigerian leaders inherited this state of affairs from the 
British, and their inability to cope effectively with the seemingly over¬ 
whelming problems permitted the continued expression of regional and ethnic 
host ilities. 
In a short generation, 1900—1960, the quality of social and the style 
of political life in Nigeria assumed many different characteristics. Those 
years spanned the country's first surge of urban growth, the centralization 
and expansion of bureaucratic activities under colonial rule and a con¬ 
current attempt at widening the bases of administration and political 
recruitment. 
This new transformation came in the wake of the British presence 
and the contact of the natives with European merchants and missionaries. 
But the important thing is that this transformation did not proceed every¬ 
where at the same speed and its intensity varied from sector to sector, 
region to region, within the society. This unevenness in the develop¬ 
mental process led to an ardent struggle for power over the distribution 
or redistribution of scarce resources among the emergent contenders who 
were laying exclusive claims on the operation of the government. Thus, 
the period was not only a time of great political and social development, 
but also a time of profound political conflict, regionalism and tribalism. 
The main task of this case study then centers on the analysis of a 
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set of structural changes and how these changes in turn generated the 
social climate that was conducive to political protests and developments 
in Nigeria during the period 1900-1970. In discussing this topic, anthro¬ 
pology, history, political science and sociology have equal relevance. 
Thus, in this study the writer has attempted to place the great struggles 
for power in the context of the whole range of historical facts with 
greater attention to the unevenness of change in the society and the 
divisions, and cleavages among and within the regions and ethnic groups. 
In the treatment of the subject, the following points are discussed: 
1. Traditional urbanization in Africa. 
2. Urbanization of ethnic groups in Nigeria. 
3. Treatment of various ethnic groups by colonial 
administrators. 
4. Early protests and political organization. 
5. Intensification of the politics of tribalism in 
order to control the center. 
6. Failure of the first Republic to integrate and 
possible suggestions for the future. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The important role of cities in nation-building has generally been 
recognized. According to Spengler, "nations are the true city-building 
peoples. In the strongholds they arose, with the cities they ripen to the 
full height of their world-consciousness, and in the world-cities they 
dissolve."^ In his book, Mumford points out that the Roman Empire was "the 
product of a single expanding urban power-center" and was itself "a vast 
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city-building enterprise." 
In Africa, cities have played a similar role in nation building and 
3 
emo.res as in other parts of the world. The kingdoms of Old Sudan—Ghana, 
Mali and Songhay, were all the result of expanding urban power centers 
whirr, because of their superior iron technology, were able to control the 
flow of gold to the Mediterranean. Despite the distortions of the history 
of Africa by Europeans, the early Portuguese explorers reported that they 
found Benin, the capital of the city-state of the same name, prosperous, 
k 
peaceful and orderly and devoted to the working of metals and woods. The 
^Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (New York, 1939), p. 171. 
2 
Lewis Mumford, The City in History (New York, 1961), p. 205- 
3 
See Basil Davidson, The Lost Cities of Africa (Boston, 1959)* 
^Ibid., pp. 134ff. 
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ruins of Zimbabwe are the mute evidence of a vast tribal-feudal kingdom 
in Southern Africa. 
There can be no question concerning the existence of cities and thei 
importance in Africa before the coming of the Europeans.^ However, this 
study focuses on the role of the new cities of Africa, which are mainly 
the product of modern industrialization in Africa. These new cities are 
different from the cities which existed before the coming of the Europeans 
The preindustrial African city was a market place and the seat of feudal 
powe'-. and often the center of a religious cult. It lacked the dynamism 
of the modern industrial city, a fact which is of primary importance in 
considering urbanization in relation to social and political changes in 
Africa» 
the new African cities, like the cities of the Western World, are 
cba-acrerized by their heterogeneous population. By heterogeneous popu¬ 
lations we mean that people of different racial and cultural backgrounds 
are rrawn into the cities. In the case of African cities it is not so 
much a question of different races but of peoples drawn from different 
triba' or cultural backgrounds. In his survey of Sekondi-Takoradi, Busia 
states that 62 tribal divisions, including Europeans and other foreigners 
2 
as one tribal division, were represented in that city in 1951. 
Other cities of Africa, more especially the new cities, exhibit 
a similar ethnic and tribal heterogeneity. In the traditional cities 
^Williams Bascom, "Urbanization Among the Yoruba," The American 
Journal of Sociology 60 (March 1955): 446-454. 
2 
K. A. Busia, Report on a Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi 
(London, 1951), p- 3- 
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the section settled by the newer ethnic and tribal elements are sometimes 
marked off by the older sections inhabited by lineage or kinship groups.^ 
The increasing heterogeneity of urban centers is very important in nation 
building because only as Africans escape from their lineage or kinship 
attachments and become free of tribal particularisms can they develop a 
national consciousness. For example, as long as an African thinks of 
himself as a Yoruba or an Ibo or a Hausa and maintains his loyalty to one 
or the other of these people, it will be impossible for a Nigerian nation 
to develop. As Coleman has pointed out, it is the stranger sectors of 
the cities of Nigeria that have become centers of nationalist activity, 
while the attachment of Africans to lineage groups in the tradition-bound 
older centers of the cities has been an obstacle to the emergence of a 
2 
nationalist outlook during and after colonial rule. 
The purpose in this study is to consider the manner in which the 
political processes involved in urbanization affected the problems of 
national integration and political stability in Nigeria. That is, in 
effect, the present study is focused upon the social and historical back¬ 
ground of the emergence of nationalism in Nigeria. In spite of its great 
significance in the modern world, nationalism has received relatively little 
attention on the part of American sociologists. Neither the students of 
political sociology, nor those of social movements, have shown much interest 
in the subject, leaving it to be explored by other disciplines—history, 
political science, and more recently anthropology. 
^J. S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley, 1958), 
pp. 78-79. 
2Ibid., p. 79- 
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Nigeria is one of the largest of the independent countries in Africa. 
It is also the most heavily populated of all political units in Africa 
and the twelfth most populous country in the world. It contains within 
its borders the three largest nationalities in Africa—each numbering more 
than nine million people as shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
NIGERIA'S MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS 






I b i b i o 2,006,489 
Tiv 1,393,649 
I jaw 1,088,885 
Edo 954,770 
Other Nigerians 10,851,071 
Total 55,558,163 
Source: Nigerian Census, Lagos, 1963- 
Moreover, the groups that make up its population reflect the widest 
range of political organization of any territory on the continent. It is 
the only political entity in Africa where most of the main African Langu- 
* 
age groups are found. In short, in terms of size, wealth and diversity, 
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Nigeria has much to distinguish it from other areas. 
The analysis will primarily cover the period from 1900 to 1975- 
Nineteen hundred was the date when "Nigeria" emerged as a political unit 
known to the world and the peoples living within its boundaries, and 
1975 marks that point in time when the new nation settled down with social 
and political problems by creating nineteen states in the country, thereby 
giving all ethnic groups a say in the government. 
The discussion to follow is divided into five chapters. Chapter II 
describes the historical trends in urbanization of different groups. 
Chapter III is the analysis of early political activity. Chapter IV 
contains a general survey of the growth and institutionalization of 
ethnic sectionalism or regionalism in politics, through the constitutional 
conferences hosted by the colonial government. Chapter V describes the 
tr'ba" or ethnic competition for dominance before independence which 
leads to tribal or regional conflicts after independence and eventually 
resales in secession and civil war from 1967 to 1970. Then, Chapter VI 
is the summary and conclusion. 
CHAPTER II 
URBANIZATION AND ETHNICITY 
Historical Trends in Urbanization of Different Groups 
Since the establishment of British administration in Nigeria, western 
economic forces have profoundly changed both the structure of traditional 
Nigerian societies and the perspectives of Nigerian peoples. The tempo 
anc character of changes created situations and attitudes that have pre¬ 
disposed many Nigerians to racial consciousness and nationalist activity. 
With political stability and internal security assured by the British 
presence, the new economic forces gave rise to new urban centers and accel- 
ereoec the growth of most traditional centers. Since the major employing 
agencies (government and commercial firms) had their headquarters in cities, 
the majority of Nigerians drawn into salaried and wage employment became 
urban dwellers. As entrepots in the expanding market economy, cities be¬ 
came centers of activity for the new urban class of traders and merchants. 
Most of the secondary schools were located in or near the larger cities 
(for example, Lagos, Ibadan, Onitsha, Calabar and Zaria), which meant that 
each upcoming generation of school boys in training for clerkdom were 
inured to and seduced by city life before they secured their first jobs. 
The cities became not only melting pots, but the breeding and training 
grounds, as well as the arenas of Nigerian nationalism. 
A direct consequence of urban life has been the intensification of 
6 
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the division of labor. As urban Nigerians became increasingly dependent 
upon their occupational specialities or salaried jobs, they lost the eco¬ 
nomic and psychological security of the lineage and the self-sufficient 
rural community. Their physical removal from customary sanctions, tradi¬ 
tional authorities, and parental surveillance alone gave them a sense of 
personal freedom and anxiety not previously experienced. Furthermore, 
the impersonality, heterogeneity, and competitiveness of urban life accen¬ 
tuated their personal insecurity as well as their individualism. The latter 
became more pronounced as a result of the quest not only for survival but 
also for status and prestige within the urban social structure. 
The city was also a center for intensive acculturation.^ There 
Nigerians not only came into daily and intimate contact with Europeans 
and with educated and sophisticated Africans, but also saw varieties of 
Eurooean-made gadgets and goods on conspicuous display. The acculturating 
influence of the city was in turn carried to rural homelands through kin- 
shin associations and tribal unions or by the vivid oral reports of return¬ 
ing migrants. Urban dwellers became acutely aware of the wide gap between 
the higher standards of living and greater amenities of the city—especially 
in the European quarters—and the poverty of their rural villages. They 
therefore consciously endeavored to take the enlightenment, modernity, and 
"civilization" of the urban centers to the villages. Tribal unions were 
The acculturation role of the city in Nigeria has been not unlike 
that of the city in Yucatan, where urban influence extended into the 
hinterland to the town, the peasant village, and the tribal village. Cited 
by W. Schwartz, Nigeria (New York, 1968), p. 18. 
8 
the main agents in this process of early diffusion, just as they were later 
in spreading to the rural areas the political consciousness and nationalist 
ideas born in the urban centers. 
These general consequences of urbanization must, however, be somewhat 
qualified. The developments noted were, at best, only broad tendencies, 
with wide variations in their occurrence.^ The tribal variations in urban 
development prior to the Western impact are significant in an evaluation 
of the economic, social and political consequences of that impact. The 
data it Table 2 reveal that the Yorubas in the Western State are the most 
highly urbanized people in Nigeria, yet during the period 1921-1952 they 
had the lowest rate of urban growth, and the population of their cities 
were tie least heterogeneous in all Nigeria, and part from Lagos, their 
cities have been least affected by the urbanization resulting from the 
Western intrusion. 
The pattern of urban development in the Eastern states and particu¬ 
lar 1/ among the Ibo peoples of the East-Central state, sharply contrasts 
with ere Yoruba pattern. There were no pre-existent cities. As late as 
1931 mere were no cities with a population of more than 20,000 throughout 
that vast and heavily populated area. By 1952, however, there were four 
cities, each with a population of more than 50,000, of which 85 per cent 
Whe consequences in Nigeria were but approximations of the general 
characteristics of "urbanism" as described by Louis Wirth in "Urban 
Sociology and Civilization" American Journal of Sociology 45 (March 1940): 
752; and "Urbanism as a Way of Life," American Journal of Sociology 45 
(March 1938): 1-8. 
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TABLE 2 
PROPORTION OF EACH STATE LIVING IN URBAN CENTERS WITH 











North-Western Hausa 5,733,295 481,648 8.4 
North Central Hausa 4,098,306 505,602 12.3 
Kano Hausa 5,774,840 343,685 6.0 
North-Eastern Kanuri 7,793,444 839,968 10.8 
Benue-Plateau Tiv 4,009,407 378,013 9.4 
Kwara Nupe 2,399,366 473,397 19.7 
South-East Ibibio/Ef ik 3,622,592 249,393 6.9 
East—Central Ibo 7,227,559 853,426 11.8 
Rivers I jaw 1,544,313 249,056 16.1 
Mid—West Edo 2,535,839 283,778 11.2 
West Yoruba 9,487,526 4,923,410 51.9 
Lagos Yoruba 1,443,568 1,047,231 72.5 
Nigeria 55,670,005 10,628,607 19.1 
Source: Lecture for the Orientation Course for Youth Service 
Corps; Table VI, p. 18. 
was Ibo. The rate of growth of these eastern urban centers during the 
three decades from 1921-1952 (688 per cent)^ was far higher than elsewhere 
James S. Coleman, Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1958), p. 77» 
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in Nigeria. Yet, this rapid and intensive urbanization of the Ibo peoples 
since the British occupation of the whole of Nigeria is a phenomenon not 
only of the Eastern states, their homeland. Ibos also constitute more 
than one-third of the non-indigenous population of the urban centers in 
the Northern and Western states. As the figures in Table 3 reveal, the 
proportion is much higher for non-Ibo cities. These figures are important 
not only as evidence of the intensive, rapid, and widespread urbanization 
of the Ibo peoples, but also as a partial insight into their vanguard 
role in the nationalist movement. 
TABLE 3 
DEGREE OF IBO URBANIZATION OUTSIDE 
IBOLAND EARLY 1950's 
Indiqenous Group 
Percent of Ibo in Non- 
Indiqenous Population 
Lagos Yoruba 44.8 
Benin City Edo 53.5 
Sapele Urhobo 48.0 
Calabar Efik/lbibio 50.7 
Kano Hausa 38.0 
Zari a Hausa 39.0 
Kaduna Mixed 40.7 
Source: Population Census of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1952 
(Lagos: Government Statistician, 1953-1954); Population Census of the 
Eastern Region of Nigeria, 1953 (Lagos: Government Statistician, 1953— 
1954); Population Census of Northern Region of Nigeria, 1952 (Lagos: 
Government Statistician, 1952-1953)* 
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In the Hausa-Fulani urbanization, the tribal homogeneity of indige¬ 
nous peoples was to a large extent preserved. It was in the stranger 
section on the periphery of the traditional city that one found hetero¬ 
geneity, a weakening of lineage ties, and evidence of the instability, 
insecurity, and atomism frequently attributed to modern urban life.^ The 
compartimentaiization of urban life in Western and Northern cities has, 
however, inhibited political integration and the development of a cosmo¬ 
politan or "nationalist" outlook. The stranger sectors have been the 
centers of nationalist activity, partly because of the higher education 
and t':bal composition of the population and the greater impact of a 
cosmopolitan urban life, but also because of grievances and frustrations 
felt ry the strangers at being treated as outcasts and subjects of the 
traditional city heads, who, of course, were supported by British 
1 aurnor-ty. 
~hsse different patterns of urbanization in Nigeria are relevant 
to a study of the roots of nationalism in that we can give qualified 
acceptance to the proposition that urbanization leads to social disinte¬ 
gration and a greater susceptibility to nationalism and political activity. 
,In its early stages political activity in Nigeria was a wholly urban 
phenomenon as expressed in traditional or tribal unions. 
In the Northern Region both ruling Emirs and the British authori¬ 
ties had good political reasons for maintaining the separation between 
the traditional sector and the stranger sector. It was a logical corol¬ 
lary of indirect rule, but it has also served to shield the peoples of 
the indigenous sector from unsettling political ideas and from active 
contact with the more nationalist-minded Southerners living in the Sabon 
garis. In the Yoruba cities of the West, the separation was partly 
economic in character. 
12 
Ethnie Unions in Urban Centers 
From the late 1920's on, kinship and tribal unions sprang up in the 
main urban centers of Nigeria. These associations were known by various 
names: for example, Calabar Improvement League, Naze Family Meeting, Ngwa 
Clan Union, Owerri Divisional Union, Igbirra Progressive Union and Urhobo 
Renascent Convention. These unions gave organizational expression to the 
persistent feeling of loyalty and obligation to the kinship group and the 
town or village where the lineage was localized. 
Curing the forty-year period 1911-1951» the number of Ibos in Lagos 
increased from 264 to 26,000.^ In the Northern States there were less 
than 5,300 Ibos in 1921, and nearly 12,000 by 1931, and by 1951 the number 
had •'-vc-eased to more than 120,000. These figures become more meaningful 
when t is realized that most of the Ibo immigrants gravitated to the 
urran centers where wage employment could be obtained. The influx of Ibos 
into tie towns of the West and North, and their rapid educational develop¬ 
ment which made them competitors for jobs and professional positions were 
two indicators of their emergence as an active group in Nigerian affairs. 
Another factor of indeterminate significance in the Ibo awakening was a 
certain characteristic personality and the behavioral traits attributed 
to the group. Some observers have sought to relate such traits to dis¬ 
tinctive patterns of Ibo culture. Green points out that is the "go-getter" 
who is admired "the man who has wives and children and bestirs himself and 
2 
makes money. ... A man who just sits quiet is not respected." 
^P. Amaury Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria (Oxford, 1962), 
Vol. IV; Population Census of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1952, Bulle¬ 
tin No. 5 (Lagos, 1953). 
^M. B. Green, Ibo Village Affairs (London, 1947), p. 255. 
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The Ibo attitude toward authority and Ibo individualism in political 
affairs were partly the outgrowth of the conciliar and "democratic" 
character of Ibo political processes. Moreover, the Ibo political system 
gave latitude to youth. An enterprising, talented young man who acquired 
wealth could attain political power, even over his elders.^ Ibo youths 
were organized into age-group associations which not only had disciplinary 
power over their members but also played important political and judicial 
2 
roles within the community. In these features, Ibo culture differed 
markecly from both Yoruba and Hausa cultures, which placed a great value 
on age and ascribed status. 
On the whole, then, when one considers the traditional political 
cult^e of the Ibos, the largest ethnic group in Nigeria's Eastern states, 
one r-scovers neither a constitutional monarchy nor a theocracy. Instead, 
one ‘: confronted with a strong republicanism which features a wide dis¬ 
persal of tribal authority based on patrilineal kinship groups. 
unlike the Hausas or the Yorubas, the Ibos never developed permanent 
large-scale state systems. Equalitarianism, individualism and achievement 
were highly placed in their value system, and there was a high degree of 
popular participation in the process of policy making. It is for these 
reasons that the political culture of the Ibos is often referred to as 
"parademocratic" at least, if not "democratic". 
With the Yorubas, there existed what one might call a c'neck-and- 
balance machinery through which political excesses by the Oba were con¬ 
trolled. Patrilineage was the basic element in the Yoruba political 
^Ibid., p. 191 • 
2 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, Renascent Africa (Lagos, 1937), p. 24. 
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system. The lineages headed by the oldest member of the descent groups 
clustered together to form politically unified towns. 
The Yoruba political culture tended to be a mix of certain aspects 
of the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani political culture. The Yoruba Oba was both 
secular and sacred. In spite of the fusion of both secular and sacred, 
the Yoruba Oba was not absolute. Traditionally, he was a constitutional 
monarch who, more often than not, accepted the policy advice of the senior 
chiefs. It is therefore not surprising that the Ibo village was tradi¬ 
tionally more autonomous than its Yoruba counterpart. 
The Fulani Empire, in the Northern states of Nigeria, has as its 
distinguishing quality the large-scale state form of political organiza¬ 
tion. Looking at emirate rule from the standpoint of the commoner, 
Richard Skiar and C. S. Whitaker indicated that "emirate rule was despotic 
in fcr-rj" because "the personal security of the commoner depended wholly 
on the uncertain benevolence of his overlords.Concerning the nature 
ana structure of emirate rule, they continued, "Fief-holders residing 
at the capital of an emirate were clients of the Emirs; they were in turn 
patrons of subordinate agents through whom they administered and exploited 
the subject communities within their jurisdiction. The concentration of 
'de jure' power and authority in the hands of the emir tended to inhibit 
any opposition to him, even from those within the ranks of the ruling 
2 
stratum". The emirs, unlike the Yoruba Oba, therefore, tended to be 
^Richard L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker, "The Federal Republic of 
Nigeria" in Gwendolen Carter, ed; National Unity and Regionalism in Eight 
African States (Ithaca, 1966), p. 12. 
^ I b i d., p. 12. 
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despotic. In short, the Hausa-Fulani Empire was a theocratic dynasty, 
for the emir claimed unquestioned religious sanctions derived through 
divine delegation. Consequently, one dared not question the authority or 
the wisdom of God's appointed. Thus, dissimilar political cultures— 
parademocratic versus monarchical versus theocratic autocratic—were jux¬ 
taposed within the state of Nigeria, right from the time of early poli¬ 
tical activity. 
CHAPTER III 
PATTERNS OF EARLY POLITICAL ACTIVITY: ANTI-COLONIAL 
AGITATION BASED IN URBAN CENTERS 
On several occasions in the two decades preceding World War I, 
residents of Lagos vigorously protested actions of the British government 
in Nigeria. Four of the protests will be examined. The measures that 
were resented were largely necessary to the government's program of estab¬ 
lishing formal British rule over Nigeria at the turn of the century.^ 
These eariy protests were in the nature of "primary resistance" to the 
Britisn pressures, in that they were particular responses to particular 
imperial measures deemed oppressive or onerous rather than fundamental 
challenges to imperial rule or positive affirmations of the objective 
of Nigerian self-government. But the rancor produced by the official 
measures, and the political awakening that accompanied demonstrations of 
There were many manifestations of protests and resistance from 
the very beginning of the expansion of British influence in Nigeria. 
Some of these are briefly described in Vol. I of P. Amaury Talbot, The 
Peoples of Southern Nigeria (Oxford, 1962). At the time of economic uni¬ 
fication of the Lagos settlements with the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1883, 
the African traders and merchants of Lagos and along the Niger and Benue 
rivers strongly protested. After the Berlin Conference of 1885, these 
groups intensified their agitation demanding formal separation of Lagos 
from Gold Coast (Ghana). Partly in response to this pressure, a new 
charter was granted by the imperial government in January, 1886, making 
Lagos a separate Colony. See T. Olawale Elias, "Makers of Nigerian Law," 
West Africa (December 3, 1955)• 1135. 
16 
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popular resentment, helped not only to foment distrust of British inten¬ 
tions, but also to lay the groundwork for a more programmatic form of 
nationalism. 
The first incident occurred in 1895^ when the governor proposed a 
house and land tax on the inhabitants of Lagos. In response, about 5,000 
Lagos citizens went to Government House to demonstrate their strong oppo- 
2 
sition, and as a result the tax measure was never enforced. The second 
wave of protest, occurring in late 1907 and early 1908, was provoked by 
gover-.mental expropriation of property on Lagos Island under the Land 
Acquisition Ordinance in order to provide sites for official residences. 
The resulting popular discontent was expressed in a petition sent to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. According to one report 
The natives are openly talking of stopping trade in order to 
~a<e the Governor feel how much they resent it. Several mass 
meetings have been held in Lagos, and the crowd went so far 
as to throw stones at the houses along the front, and in one 
case pulled a European merchant off his bicycle. . . it is not 
only the Government officers who are involved, but every white 
man in the colony. . . . The natives begin to see that it is 
they who are finding money to build all these fine palaces. . . 
the people look at their own poor little huts alongside the 
palatial buildings of the European and wonder how far this thing 
is to go . . . . They see these Government officers coming out 
for twelve months at a time, and then go away for six months on 
full pay, they see a pension list annually being added to; they 
see jinrickshas and servants, horses and stable boys, addition 
to the salaries of these officials. . . . The extravagance of 
the Government is becoming more than the people can stand. It 
is particularly visible in the luxuries of official Lagos life.3 
^Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Developments in Nigeria (Cambridge, 
I960), p. 14. 
^Ibid., p. 15» 
Ibid., pp. 21-22, quoting The African Mail, January 31» 1908. 
The government expropriated a Baptist chapel and dispossessed sixty-five 
18 
In January, 1908, a third government measure aroused an even stronger 
outburst of popular resentment, which found expression on several occasions 
in the following eight years. The government levied a water rate on the 
local population in order to pay loan and maintenance expenditures arising 
from the development of a potable water supply for Lagos.^ 
Also, for the first time, educated Lagosians organized the People's 
Union for the purpose of defending native rights in general, and of oppo¬ 
sing expropriation, changes in land tenure, and the water rate in par¬ 
ti cu’ar. 
Another government action that precipitated no little protest and 
organizational activity was the Colonial office appointment of the West 
African Commission in 1912 for the purpose of determining the feasibility 
of applying the Northern Nigeria system of land tenure to Southern Nigeria. 
Si-ce under that system all rights over land were "under the control and 
suoject to the disposition of the Governor", leaders of opinion in Lagos 
regarded the proposal as an imperial move to deprive Africans in Southern 
Nigeria of the right to own land. 
In general, membership in the early political associations in Lagos 
was limited to a few leaders who sought to defend what they considered 
the natural rights of Africans, and their acquired rights as British 
African residents. All unofficial members (both European and African) 
of the Legislative Council protested the appropriation of ^10,000 for 
the purpose of carrying out the expropriation. Ibid., December 6, 1907. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies supported the governor's position 
on the Land Acquisition Ordinance and rejected the petition sent to him. 
Ibid., February 14, 1908. 
\agos Chiefs and Landowners presented a long petition to Governor 
Egerton opposing the new water rate. 
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subjects, against the policies of a colonial government in the first phase 
of expansion and development. Such associations were primarily instruments 
for achieving a united front in protesting against particular grievances, 
and little effort was made to build them into permanent associations. 
Once the grievance was disposed of, the organization either became moribund 
or split into hostile factions. Indeed, in 1921,'Sir Hugh Clifford com¬ 
plained of the absence of any group from which he could obtain African 
views.^ Two years later the editor of the Nigerian Advocate lamented that 
the "fault in us in Nigeria is that we cannot exercise tolerance with one 
2 
another, and we quarrel over things that do not count." 
In retrospect, it could be argued that one of the reasons for such 
weakness among Nigerians was the absence of meaningful political roles for 
then no play, or of an arena of legitimate political activity. They lacked 
a st-ong sense of purpose upon which associational development might be 
built. In this respect, the constitution of 1923 opened a new phase in 
Nigerian political development, by electing for the first time four members 
—three for Lagos and one for Calabar to the Legislative Council. The 
Council was to legislate directly for the Lagos and Southern Provinces. 
It did not have authority over the Northern Provinces, although the Annual 
Budget for the whole country had to be passed by the Council. 
All Dissatisfaction with the Colonial Governments were 
Channeled into and Expressed in the Political Arena 
As the constitution of 1923 opened a new phase in Nigerian political 
^Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 24; quoting, Niqerian 
Advocate, August 15, 1923. 
2Ibid., p. 25. 
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development, so was there a serious dilemma in connection with the status 
and role of the educated elements. The antagonism of the white community, 
and especially of officialdom, toward educated Nigerians became more pro¬ 
nounced when it was realized not only that they were the source of poli¬ 
tical agitation, but also that they aspired to greater participation in 
the government. It was the educated Nigerians who organized mass meetings 
in Lagos, provoked vituperative articles in the local press, and made life 
miserable and insecure for British administrators. 
When the new constitution went into effect in 1923» the intense 
competition for the three elective positions allocated to Lagos stimulated 
an unprecedented political awakening by educated elements. Two new poli¬ 
tics! parties sprang into being, and within a few years, five new newspapers 
began publication. The Nigerian National Democratic Party under the leader- 
sh'r ;f Herbert Macaulay, emerged as the most powerful group; its candidates 
were victorious in the Legislative Council elections of 1923, 1928, and 
1933- Until 1938, this party was the major force in Lagos political life. 
Although its principal function was to support candidates for the Lagos 
seats on the Legislative Council, its stated aims asserted a broader 
responsibi1ity: 
To secure the safety or welfare of the people of the Colony 
and Protectorate of Nigeria, as an integral part of the British 
Imperial Commonwealth and to carry the banner of "Right, Truth, 
Liberty and Justice" to the empyrean height of Democracy until 
the realization of its ambitious goal of "A Government of the 
People, by the People, for the People". . . and, at the same time, 
to maintain an attitude of unswerving loyalty to the Throne and 
Person of His Majesty the King Emperor, by being strictly consti¬ 
tutional in the adoption of its method and general procedure.^ 
^Constitution of the Nigerian National Democratic Party, (Lagos, 
n.d.), p. 1; quoted by Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 26. 
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The party included the following specific objectives and demands 
in its program: 
1. In regard to Lagos, 
(a) the nomination and election of the Lagos members 
of the Legislative Council (this is the party's main 
function). 
(b) the achievement of municipal status and complete 
local self-government for Lagos. 
2. In regard to Nigeria, 
(a) the establishment of branches and auxiliaries of 
the party in all areas of Nigeria. 
(b) the development of higher education and the 
introduction of compulsory education throughout 
Nigeria. 
(c) economic development of the natural resources of 
Nigeria under controlled private enterprises. 
(d) free and fair trade in Nigeria and equal treatment 
for native traders and producers of Nigeria. 
(e) the Africanization of the civil service. 
(f) the recognition of the National Congress of 
British West Africa and the pledge to work 
hand-in-hand with that body in support of its 
entire program.1 
Notwithstanding its claim to be "Nigerian" and "National" the Demo¬ 
cratic party remained throughout its long history an exclusively Lagos 
organization, although abortive efforts were made to establish branches at 
Abeokuta, Ibadan, and Kano. The failure to nationalize the party was due 
in part to Herbert Macaulay, who was not only thoroughly preoccupied with 
1 
Kal u Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 30. 
22 
the defense of the House of Docemo (the House of Docemo were the tradi¬ 
tional ruler of Lagos and supporters of Herbert Macaulay's NNDP against 
the colonial government), but also determined to keep the party under his 
firm control. The establishment of branches outside Lagos could have 
challenged his leadership. 
The Constitution of the party clearly stated that branches in the 
protectorate would be "subject to the direction and control of Parent Body 
in Lagos.Secondly, until 1931 Lagos was the only urban area in Nigeria 
(except for Calabar in the Cross River State which had one representative) 
where Africans could directly elect a legislative representative. The 
nati-e administration system, which prevailed throughout the protectorate, 
did not allow for party activity. In a few urban areas in the Southern 
Provinces, as well as in second-class towns (for example, Port Harcourt, 
Aba. £-ugu, Kaduna, Kano, Jos, Sokoto, and Benin City), there was a 
fair"/ early development of local political organizations, but variations 
in the systems of government and in the scope allowed local bodies made 
affiliation with the NNDP pointless, even if there had been a desire for 
such affiliation. Thus parochialism, the lack of common consciousness, 
and the desire of Lagos leaders to retain leadership were crucial determi¬ 
nants in confirming Western-style political activity in Lagos. But the 
system of indirect rule and the limitation of the elective principle to 
Lagos were equally important. In Calabar, where one member was elected 
to the Legislative Council, the Calabar Improvement League engaged in some 
2 
political activity. 
^Ibid., p. 40. 
^Historical Records of the Calabar Improvement League, Calabar, 
Nigeria, quoted by E. A. Keay and T. Thomas, West African Government 
(Ibadan, 1965)} p. 113* 
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Although the Democratic party confined its activities to Lagos, it 
frequently took a "national" stand on issues; thus it fostered the con¬ 
sciousness, among Lagosians at least, that Lagos was part of a larger 
territory called Nigeria. In 1930 the party sent a deputation to the 
governor to discuss such national matters as the trade depression and 
appointment and deposition of chiefs. At a series of mass meetings held 
periodically throughout the fifteen years of its dominance (1923-1938), 
the party occasionally raised issues of an all-Nigerian nature and frequently 
criticized the government. Moreover, Dr. C. C. Adeniyi-Jones, president of 
the party and one of its representatives in the Legislative Council from 
192Ô—1938, was the most militantly critical member of the council. He 
frequently raised provocative and challenging questions which applied to 
all Nigeria or more frequently, to the African race. The debates of the 
Leg’s^ative Council during his tenure in office provide a good index to 
the growth of racial and national consciousness.^ 
The ~jr~ninq Point in Nationalistic Activities 
Several developments in the latter part of 1937 and in 1938 produced 
a radically new twist in nationalist thinking and organizational activity 
in Nigeria. Two militant nationalists with strong personalities returned 
from abroad with zeal and determination to arouse a more positive national¬ 
ism; Nnamdi Azikiwe (Ibo), an American-trained political scientist and 
journalist; and H. A. Davis (Yoruba), a former student of Harold Laski. 
^Legislative Council Debates, Nigeria, June 12, 193^+» pp. 42-43; 
quoted by E. A. Keay and H. Thomas, West African Government, p. 111. 
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Their arrival, coupled with developments within Nigeria, rejuvenated the 
Lagos-centered Youth Movement which, in the next three years, became the 
first Nigeria-wide multitribal nationalist organization in Nigerian history. 
Events during these three crucial years laid bare certain underlying factors 
which were destined to shape the subsequent course of the nationalist move¬ 
ment . 
During the fifteen-year period 193*4-1949, Nnamdi Azikiwe was undoubt¬ 
edly the most important and celebrated nationalist leader on the West coast 
of Africa, if not in all tropical Africa. Azikiwe spent his first seven 
years ;n America at segregated Negro colleges in the Southern atmosphere 
of discrimination and caste. Profound changes were occurring in the 
character of protest activity among American Negroes with the growth of a 
militant press, the emergence of a "Negro Renaissance" with a new emphasis 
upon the rediscovery of Africa, the "Black Nationalism" of Garveyism, the 
Communist Party, race riots, lynchings, and mass demonstrations all reaching 
high pitch during the four years preceding the Depression. As a poor stu¬ 
dent, Azikiwe was compelled to work as a dishwasher, a steward, a coal 
miner, and even as a boxer. Thus he felt the full impact of the discrimi¬ 
nation and economic insecurity that befell the average American Negro. As 
a result of his nine years in the United States, Azikiwe was determined to 
be a leader, with the West Coast of Africa as his arena, in the world-wide 
struggle to emancipate the Negro race. 
Although Azikiwe's power and influence resulted partly from his fresh 
and militant approach, they also reflected the fact that he was the first 
non-Yoruba Nigerian (apart from Ernest Ikoli, an Ijaw) to emerge into 
prominence. For forty-five years the Ibo had been on the periphery of 
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Nigerian politics. They were the last of the major groups in Southern 
Nigeria to be pacified by the British Colonials. Their passion for educa¬ 
tion and their desire to catch up with other groups were insatiable. It 
was commonly remarked by Ibos themselves that "an Ibo would accept educa¬ 
tion from anyone, even from the Devil.During the 1920!s and 1930's 
educational facilities in Iboland expanded at a far greater rate than in 
any other area of Nigeria. Azikiwe at once became a symbol of Ibo (indeed, 
of all non-Yoruba) achievement and emancipation, and he was able to mobilize 
the political support of Ibos, who by then v/ere scattered all over urban 
centers in Nigeria. The nationalistic theme in his nationalism has been 
the Unity of Nigeria: "We can never split—no, never. We are not a party, 
we are a national government whose mission is the regeneration of our 
father!and."^ 
Stimulated by these new, provocative influences, the Nigerian Youth 
Movement assumed a more active political and national role. It contested 
and won Lagos Town Council elections, then it turned to challenge the fifteen- 
year domination of Macaulay and his National Democratic Party over Lagos 
politics and representation on the Legislative Council. Until 1938, nomina¬ 
tion and election to the three Lagos seats in the Legislative Council had 
usually been settled within the confines of Herbert Macaulay's home. In 
the October, 1938 elections, however, the Youth Movement, which had in the 
meantime established its own journal the "Daily Service", launched a vigorous 
James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1966), p. 224. 
2 
Daily Service, October 5» 1938, quoted by 0. Arikpo, The Development 
of Modern Nigeria (London, 1967), p. 11. 
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campaign and defeated Macaulay's party. This meant a radical change in 
traditional leadership. One of the main points in the platform of the 
Youth Movement was that Nigerians should assume the leadership of the 
country, referring, no doubt, to the fact that many Democratic party 
leaders had been native foreigners,^ that is, non-Nigerian Africans who 
were living in Lagos and became Nigerian citizens by adoption. Thus, this 
was the first major step in the Nigerianization of the nationalist movement. 
In February 1941, the Nigerian Youth Movement met a devastating blow from 
whicn it never really recovered. The Akinsanya crisis was the first major 
man-festation of tribal tension that affected all subsequent efforts to 
achieve unity. 
The immediate cause of the Akinsanya crisis in the Nigerian Youth 
Movement was disagreement over the selection of a candidate for a seat in 
the Legislative Council vacated by Dr. K. A. Abayomi, outgoing president 
of the NYM. Ernest Ikoli, an Ijaw, who was editor of the Lagos Daily Service, 
the psrty^ official organ—and recently elected president of the party, and 
Samuel Akinsanya, an Ijebu Yoruba and vice-president of the party, offered 
themselves as candidates. Both Ikoli and Akinsanya had been founders of 
the party, and both were members of the elite group in Lagos, but the former 
was selected over the latter. Akinsanya, the West African Pilot, Azikiwe, 
and some Ibos and Ijebus interpreted this action as a manifestation of tri¬ 
bal discrimination, because normally other Yorubas tended to show prejudice 
against Ijebus. As a consequence, Azikiwe resigned, and a number of Ibos 
and Ijebus went with him, and the NYM practically disintegrated despite the 
effort of many leaders to revive it. The movement had, however, created a 
^Ibid., p. 15. 
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force in the form of the young people, many of whom among the Ijebu and 
the Ibo flocked to AzikiweEs standard. 
The lull in party activity which followed the Ikoli-Akinsaya affair 
did not last long, for in 1942 the Nigeria Reconstruction Group was founded 
by Azikiwe and other leaders, notably M. E. R. Okorodudu, E. E. Esua and 
L. A. Onojobi. Its membership was limited to intellectuals, and its ob¬ 
jective was to engage in social research in all sorts. The group tried 
to found a national front in collaboration with the NYM, whose function 
would be to inculcate in the minds of Nigerians the idea of oneness and 
the consciousness of kind.^ 
The early years of World War II therefore marked the beginning of a 
new era in which the nationalist movement was destined to be of an entirely 
different order from that of the preceding two generations. It was a 
period of transition from a tired and parochial older set, to a younger 
group of intellectuals whose ambitions and aspirations were far more in¬ 
tense, positive, and urgent. The Youth Movement had tried but failed to 
embrace both elements: the old who were weary and discredited, and the 
young who were zealous, impatient, and leaderless. The profound social and 
economic changes during World War II brought forth new leadership, mobi¬ 
lized new forces, and created a radically different climate of opinion and 
a setting more congenial to the development of a positive nationalism with 
the formation of many national parties due to changes in the constitution. 
^Nnamdi Azikiwe, The Development of Political Parties in Nigeria 
(London, 1957)» p. 41. 
CHAPTER IV 
ETHNICITY AND POLITICS 
Introduction and Institutionalization of Ethnic Sectionalism 
as the Basis for Political Organization and Activity 
The geographical entity called "Nigeria" today is indeed a British 
imperial creation. Chief Obafemi Awolowo noted in his lecture at Saint 
Pan-eras Town Hall in London in I960: 
(■; that Nigeria is a British creation 
(2) that Nigeria consists of a multiplicity of races who 
are as different from one another as the races of Europe. 
(3) that for about forty-three years previous, the British 
had striven to unite all these diverse people . . . 
and to infuse in them a sense of common nationality.^ 
The existence of Nigeria was not made possible until just about half a 
cerc_—y ago, when Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard conquered the Moslem 
emirates of what is today northern Nigeria. 
A brief review of the main stages in the development of British 
administration may be helpful to an understanding of the problem of 
Nigeria's constitutional development and the internal political forces 
that have influenced them. 
Modern Nigeria did not spring into being as a complete whole both 
^Donald S. Rothchild, Toward Unity in Africa: 
tion in British Africa (Washington, I960), p. 142. 
A Study of Federa- 
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politically and administratively. Even the name "Nigeria" was first 
officially recognized in a House of Commons debate on the Royal Niger Com¬ 
pany in July, 1899, but there was no such official entity as "Nigeria" 
until 1900, neither did Nigeria have a common ruler before this date, as 
separate territories continued in practice. 
The speech of Governor Sir Hugh Clifford before the so-called 
Nigeria council on December 29» 1920, illustrates: 
. . . the suggestion that there is, or can be in the visible 
future, such a thing as a "West African Nation" is as mani¬ 
fest an absurdity as that there is, or can be, an "European 
Nation" at all events until the arrival of the Millennium.... 
Tee peoples of West Africa do not belong to the same stock and 
are not of common descent; . . . (they have) no common language 
. . . and no community of religious beliefs. ... As a matter 
of fa_t, the Hausa of Zaria, the Bantu tribesmen of the valley 
of the Benue, and say the Fantis of Gold Coast are less nearly 
allied to one another than are, for example, the Scandinavians 
of the Baltic, the Slavs of Bulgaria and the Semitic peoples 
of Egypt and Morocco . . . Any advancement or recognition of 
tuese ridiculous claims and pretensions. . . is mischievous, 
oecause they are incompatible with that natural development of 
real national self-government which all true patriots in 
Nigeria. . . should continue to secure and maintain. ... It 
is the consistent policy of the government of Nigeria to main¬ 
tain and support the local tribal institutions and the indige¬ 
nous forms of Government . . . which are to be regarded as the 
natural expression of (African) political genius. ... I am 
entirely convinced of the separate institutions ... to main¬ 
tain that each one of them is, in a very real sense, a nation. 
. . .It is the task of the Government of Nigeria to build up 
and fortify these national institutions.^ 
But Sir Hugh did not stop there; he continued: 
Assuming . . . that the impossible were feasible that this 
collection of self-contained and mutually independent Native 
states, separated from one another, as many of them are, by 
great distance, by differences of history and traditions, 
James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, P- 194. 
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and by ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social and 
religious barriers, were indeed capable of being welded into 
a single homogenous nation—a deadly blow would thereby be 
struck at the very root of national self-government in Nigeria, 
which secures to each separate people the right to maintain its 
identity, its individuality and its nationality, its own chosen 
form of government; and the peculiar political and social insti¬ 
tutions which have been evolved for it by the wisdom and by the 
accumulated experience of generations of its forebears.^ 
According to the above statements by Sir Hugh as the representative 
of the British Government, it means Nigeria began as a collection of 
contiguous British possessions and became independent as a loose federa¬ 
tion on the Australian model. After World War I, British administra¬ 
tors tried to unify Nigeria's three principal areas into administrative 
regions. Lugard’s proposal of amalgamation, largely followed by the 
government established in 1914, gave the Governor-General final authority 
over the whole country. An obvious result of the federal colonial struc- 
t_-e .vas a failure to prepare Nigeria for independence because the survival 
of etnnic groups was encouraged, a development that hindered the growth 
of a feeling of being "Nigerian" with corrmon problems. The indirect rule 
of lord Lugard did not promote much to the forging of a Nigerian nation, 
as Coleman wrote: 
Whatever else might be said of the application of indirect 
rule in Nigeria—and a very strong case can be made for it 
—there can be little doubt that it has complicated the task 
of welding diverse elements into a Nigerian nation.2 
By 1922, the Legislative Council of Nigeria was established but the 
Northern Region was excluded from the area of legislative competence of 
^Ibid., p. 50. 
^Ibid., p. 49. 
31 
the council. As a result of that there was no central institution between 
1922 to 19^7, as there was no history of Nigerian unity during this cru¬ 
cial period, Again Coleman stated: 
In short, before 1947 there was little opportunity for a 
Nigerian to feel that he was under a common government 
which commanded his obedience, allegiance and loyalty. 
The situation was further aggravated by the educational 
system which aimed at cultivating a "love of tribe", as 
well as by the system of native administration. . . .1 
Starting from 1900, the territorial separateness and individuality 
of the component units of the country were encouraged by the British 
Government. Each of the separate colonial territories—the colony of 
Lagos, and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria—was 
independent!y administered and directly responsible to the colonial office 
in 5'itain. Despite the unification of 191 » Lagos, which was later to 
become the capital of Nigeria, was not divested of its unique status as 
a colony but in fact retained that character until 1951. Right from the 
inception of Nigeria, the Northerners, encouraged by the British policy 
of separate development, wanted their own distinct and separate develop- 
menc, in which they would have nothing to do with the south. 
Another important factor which resulted ultimately in Nigeria's 
disunity was the British colonial policy in the field of education and 
missionary evangelization as Table 4 illustrates. This policy led to 
differences in the timing and intensity of Western education in different 
parts of Nigeria, and therefore to a differential impact. The very wide 
gap in education and social thinking between the North and the South 
came to militate against national unity. 
^Ibid., p. 50. 
TAPLE 4 
DIFFERENTIAL EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NUN THE UN AND SOUTHERN NIGERIA 
Year 
Southern Nigeria Eastern and Western Regions Northern Nigeria 
Schools 
Students 
in Attendance Schools 
Students 
in Attendance* 
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary 
1906 126 1 11,872 20 1 0 a 0 
1912 150 10 35,716 76 34 0 954 0 
1926 3,828 18 138,249 518 125 0 5,210 0 
1937 3,533 26 218,610 4,285 539 1 20,269 65 
1947 4,984 43 538,391 9,657 1,110 3 70,962 251 
1957 13,473b 176 2,343,317b 28,208 2,080 18 185,484e 3,643 
“'Attendance 
aNumber unknown 
^Figures include 30,602 students attending 94 secondary modern schools where post¬ 
primary instruction is given for three additional years for students who either are academically 
not up to the standards in full secondary schools or who cannot afford the higher fees. 
cFigure for 1956 
Source: Annual Report, Colony of Southern Nigeria, 1906, pp. 199ff; Annual Reports, North¬ 
ern Nigeria, 1900-1911; African Education (Oxford: Nuffield Foundation, 1953), pp. 47-48. Quoted 
by E. A. Keay and H. Thomas, West African Government (Ibadan, 1965), p. 215. 
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Furthermore, the internal boundaries and regional division of 
Nigeria helped to complicate matters and make the achievement of unity 
impossible. 
Because of the evil of tribalism and sectionalism, whichever region 
had control of the center through its dominant political party would at 
once be in a position to determine the economic, if not the political 
fate of all the other regions. As a result of this state of affairs, 
the struggle for power at the center became intense, and tribalism was 
fully exploited by Nigeria's politicians in the hope of achieving leader¬ 
ship and the dominating position at the center. It is for this reason 
that the census conducted in Nigeria between 1962 and 1964, and the one 
corrected by the Nigerian Military Government in 1974 turned out a huge 
failure (See Table 5 for 1952 to 1963 population census). 
Administratively, the division of Nigeria into three regions dates 
back to 1939- The Richards Constitution reaffirmed this division in 1946, 
by setting up Regional Assemblies to channel demands to a federal Legis¬ 
lative Council in Lagos. The Northern Region was for the first time 
represented in the Legislative Council. The Richards Constitution made 
no significant change in the composition of the Executive Council. It 
was simply intended to provide a link between Native Authorities and 
Government, recognizing Regional diversity. 
It was intended that the Richards Constitution should last for nine 
years, but the demand for a responsible non-official executive was becoming 
more and more vocal. One of the criticisms of the Richards Constitution 
had been the lack of prior consultation with Nigerians. In 1948, the new 
Governor, Sir John MacPherson, initiated action on a new Constitution 
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which, when it finally became law in 1951» had been preceded by three 
years of careful consultation at all levels. 
TABLE 5 
POPULATION CENSUS FIGURES 










Northern Region 16.8 22.5 31.0 29.8 
Eastern Region 7.2 12.4 12.3 12.4 
Western Region 4.6 7.8 7.8 10.3 
Midwestern Region 1.5 2.2 2.2 2.5 
Lagos Territory 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Nigeria (Total) 30.4 45.6 54.0 55.7 
Source: Walter Schwarz, Nigeria (New York, 1968), p. 163» 
The first great change introduced by the MacPherson Constitution 
was the creation of Regional Legislatures in the full sense. In addition, 
direct election to the central legislature was ended: The regional legis¬ 
latures would provide the federal delegates. Ending direct popular election 
to the central legislature emphasized the regional context of Nigeria's 
political awakening. At the same time, this regional focus deepened because 
of the decentralization of the new constitutional provisions. The most 
significant political result of the 1951 MacPherson Constitution was the 
attention each of the new political parties subsequently gave to its own 
region. It is crucial to note at this point that as the constitutional 
development of Nigeria came under the influence of Nigerian politicians 
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and came to reflect their views, divisive trends began to dominate, and 
British administration provided the major unifying influence. 
With the approach of independence and the consequent intensification 
of regional hostilities, the politics of tribalism or regionalism (National 
Council of Nigerian Citizens—NCNC, Eastern Region; Action Group—AG, 
Western Region; and Northern Peoples1 Congress—NPC, Northern Region) took 
on s new dimension. The Yoruba and Ibo politicians realized that neither 
of them could control national political power without securing a signi¬ 
fies!-.: political foothold in the Northern region. The NCNC formed alli¬ 
ance with the Northern Elements Progressive Union—NEPU, and the Action 
Group with the United Middle Belt Congress—UMBC, in order to challenge 
the 'tiling NPC in the region. Thus, both Southern parties—the NCNC and 
AG. ed sufficient support in regions other than their own to present 
themselves as truly national in character. 
What then, have been the major effects of the colonial period on 
the Nigerian peoples? In the absence of any major commitment to weld a 
Nigerian identity, differences between the major Nigerian ethnic groups 
have not decreased. If anything, as the sociologist P. C. Lloyd has indi¬ 
cated, the opposite trend has occurred: 
In doing so little to break down traditional patterns of 
residence and allegiance, economic development has not con¬ 
tributed to any reduction in inter-ethnic differences. In 
fact, it may be notoriously uneven, and these new inequalities 
are superimposed on all existing rivalries.1 
In sum, colonial rule failed to mold Nigerians into one political or 
constitutional system. Therefore, there was no basis for a dominant set 
P. C. Lloyd, The Ethnic Background to the Nigerian Crisis (London, 
1968), pp. 2-4. 
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of political attitudes and ethics created. What the MacPherson constitu¬ 
tion did was to give the three main cultural groupings in each of the three 
regions, not only the opportunity to demonstrate their incompatibilities 
and mutual distrust but also the opportunity to view the position of things 
to come in terms of ethnic competition for power in the first Republic. 
CHAPTER V 
COMPETITION, CONFLICT AND CIVIL WAR 
1. Competition for Dominance Just Before Independence 
In Nigeria, the political parties assumed an ethnic complexion well 
be~ore independence. The split between the Nigerian Youth Movement and 
the N.C.N.C. of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in the early 19401s to some extent 
followed ethnic divisions between Yoruba and Ibo—the two southern main 
gropes. The Action Group developed from the political wing of the cul¬ 
ture' association of the Yoruba educated elite, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa; the 
N.C.s.C. was closely allied with the Ibo State Union. The N.P.C. was 
fourred by the Fulani aristocracy. In the smaller ethnic groups, a local 
pol'tical party was often indistinguishable from the cultural associations. 
A second factor producing ethnic hostility is the interpersonal com¬ 
pet'd on for offices in the modern sector of the economy. 
A third factor which engenders hostility is the image of the modern 
society to be created in Nigeria. In southern Nigeria the educated elite 
have come largely from humble homes. The traditional elite of Obas, chiefs, 
and lesser title-holders today have insignificant roles at the national 
level; their remaining prestige is confined to their own communities. The 
educated elite are thus free to construct a modern society unencumbered 
by that of their past. 
In Northern Nigeria, however, the Fulani aristocracy, through the 
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NPC, retain their elite status. Their problems have been to modernize 
their society only so far as leaves their superior position unimpaired. 
This they have substantially achieved through their control of the politi¬ 
cal party, the Native Authorities, and the Alkali courts. The introduction 
of institutions from the south elected local government councils, centrally 
controlled and politically independent courts—threatens their status. 
Of the factors cited here, the first—the struggle for power, is 
inevitable in a new African state, though it is not inevitable that the 
struggle should be between ethnic groups—in Nigeria it is merely that it 
should be so. The interpersonal competition for offices is a feature of 
Southern Nigeria, which is less apparent in the North or in those African 
states which have not yet begun to produce too many educated people. The 
third factor is somewhat peculiar to Nigeria. (In a different context 
Lioeria has its traditional elite, still in power and circumspect in its 
modernizing policies). To the extent that ethnic hostility is rife, it 
may ce, and frequently is, increased by politicians who useethnic issues 
to enhance their electoral support. Ethnic arguments will be used when 
policy differences between the rival parties are minimal or where the 
policies of a party are unlikely to win popular support. Thus, at the 
grass-roots level, AG politicians often asserted that an NCNC victory in 
Western Nigeria would mean that Yorubaland would be ruled by the Ibo. 
Overtly ethnic propaganda reached its height in Akintola's attempts to win 
popular support before the Regional election of 1965» thereby leading and 
plunging the country into civil war. For more details on this, see the 
section on the emergency in Western Nigeria below. 
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2. Conflict After Independence 
(a) Tribal ism: Nigeria became an independent sovereign state on 
October 1, I960. On that date, in a solemn and colorful ceremony, Princess 
Alexandra of Kent, on behalf of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II of Great 
Britain, handed over to the late Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, the constitutional instrument of Nigeria's independence. 
By this act, Nigeria became the sixteenth African state to achieve nation¬ 
hood in I960. The various nationalist fronts in the country had joined 
hands to ensure the ending of colonial rule. Having succeeded in doing 
so or October 1, I960, it was assumed that the enthusiasm with which the 
country was launched into nationhood would sustain the Nigerian Federation 
anc ~elp her people to develop a sense of common destiny and common nation¬ 
al "'t •. The nationalists who had engaged directly and actively in the 
î"ceoendence struggle had always insisted that independence would make a 
lot of difference. They expected the emergence of a new social order in 
wh'c- the tension and oppression resulting from colonial rule would cease, 
and '■ which their leaders, acting without the restraints and limitations 
of the colonial days, would usher in an era of prosperity and progress in 
all fields. 
But events after this date were soon to prove that Nigeria's most 
vexing, most basic problems were those of tribalism, sectionalism—or 
sub-nationalism, and of leadership. Because there were no honorable and 
acceptable answers to these problems, Nigeria, during the period between 
1962 and 1966, was to be launched into a series of stormy crises which 
brought the country to the brink of disintegration and ultimately led to 
the take-over of the government by the Army on January 15, 1966. As a 
40 
result of these crises the hope of Nigerians for leadershp in African 
politics and for maximization of progress was frustrated. Indeed, Nigeria 
became the laughing-stock of the watching world. 
(b) Emergency in Western Nigeria: After the British had left, the 
major motivation for unity, that is, the nationalist struggle against 
colonial rule, was gone. Nigerians now turned their attention inwards, to 
domestic problems. Ethnic, regional or other particular interests, which 
had temporarily held back their claims, started to reassert themselves. 
Gradually the sense of restraint disappeared among the country's leaders, 
and the prospect of continued peace in Nigeria became very gloomy. As a 
result, there was crisis in Western Nigeria within the Action Group party. 
There developed a conflict between Chief Awolowo and Chief Akintola, 
the ceputy leader of the party. The former had surrendered the Premier¬ 
ship of the Western Region of Nigeria to Chief Akintola in the hope of 
becoming Prime Minister of the Federation after the Federal elections of 
1955-- The failure of his party to win the elections meant that Awolowo, 
though leader of the AG, was heading the opposition in Lagos while Akintola, 
who was only deputy leader, was governing the West. Awolowo felt that, as 
party leader, he should exercise general supervision and insisted that 
changes of policy and major appointments in the West should not be made 
until after he had been consulted. Another source of conflict was Chief 
Akintola's wish to strengthen national unity and join the Federal Prime 
Minister's coalition. Chief Awolowo was on bad terms with Sir Abubakar 
and would never agree to join a coalition. 
The final crisis came in 1964, when the Governor of the region re¬ 
ceived a petition, purporting to be signed by a majority of the members 
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of the House of Assembly and demanding Akintola's removal from the Premier¬ 
ship. The Governor, acting within what were at the time his constitutional 
powers, removed Akintola. Meanwhile, when Chief Adegbenro, the successor 
for Akintola designated by Awolowo, attempted to convene his new govern¬ 
ment, the minority of members who were against Awolowo1s scheme disrupted 
the Western Legislature so much that the Prime Minister declared a state 
of public emergency in the West. The Federal Government, using its emer¬ 
gency powers, placed the Region under an Administrator, who constituted 
the sole authority until the emergency was lifted on December 31» 1964, 
followed by elections as we shall see later. 
(c) The Census Crisis; In 1962 Nigeria had her first population 
cens_s since independence. The fact that it turned out to be a big fiasco 
shews how hard it is to establish the simplest facts when the result may 
ha'-'e -ajor political consequences. Nigeria had last been counted between 
1592 and 1953» but that was under the British. According to the results, 
the Northern Region had a population of about 17 million, the Eastern 
Reg:or 7 million, the Western and Midwestern Regions 6 million, while the 
Fece'sl Territory of Lagos had 0.3 million. The total population of 
Nigeria, therefore was given as 30 million.^ (See Table 5). The poli¬ 
tical significance of the 1952/53 census was that it assured the dominance 
of the North in the Federal Government since seats in the Federal House 
of Parliament were then allocated on a population basis. Out of the 312 
^ 1952/53 census was not accurate because many Nigerians avoided 
being counted out of the belief that the census was required in order 
to increase taxation. Source: Federal Census Office, Lagos, Nigeria, 
1963. 
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seats, the North received 174 seats, thus placing it in an absolute ma¬ 
jority. Since in Nigeria the major political parties were based on regions, 
a population census that gave the North such a majority meant handing over 
the Federal Government in perpetuity to the NPC. 
In 1962, the national census brought on another crisis. The MPC had 
ordered a recount of the census undertaken, because the result was adverse 
to the North.^ The recount was carried out, but the result was rejected 
by the Eastern Region because it was adverse to it. The weight of the 
cultural dissimilarities was being felt increasingly throughout the coun¬ 
try. The regional political elites were communicating their displeasure 
to their Federal representatives. The Ibo pariah groups in the North were 
especially vulnerable to the mounting antagonism. The difference in poli¬ 
tical-cultural orientation was a constant additive to the abrasive rela- 
tionship. 
(d) The 1964 Federal Election Crisis: Obviously, Southern Nigerians 
were determined to wrest power from the Hausa-Fulani by manipulating the 
results of 1962 census. The federal government forestalled this by con¬ 
demning the 1962 census and revising the figures. The subsequent Southern 
outcry led to a completely new census in late 1963- The results published 
in February 1964, showing a majority retained by the Northerners were re¬ 
jected by the leader of the NCNC in the Eastern Region. 
These political wars led to a rearrangement of Nigeria’s political 
coalitions. In 1964, the main contestants gathered for what was to be the 
James O'Connell in Arthur Hazlewood, ed., African Integration and 
Disinteqration (London, 1967), p. 20. 
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last major event of Nigeria's short period of democratic experiment. New 
political party alignments were creating the very situation most feared 
by Northern leaders. Up to that time, the Ibo-dominated NCNC had served 
as junior partners in the federal coalition, whose main victims had been 
Chief Awolowo (imprisoned in 1962 for ten years for treason), and his 
Yoruba followers. Now the census fiasco convinced the NCNC leader. Dr. 
Okpara, that alliance with the Hausa-Fulani was untenable. Angered by 
Akintola's support of the revised 1964 census results (an issue which 
should have united all Southerners), Okpara influenced the NCNC partici¬ 
peras in Akintola's Western Region government to leave the regional coali¬ 
tion. Okpara's NCNC then formed the United Progressive Grand Alliance 
(U?GA) consisting of NCNC; the ruling party in Eastern and Midwestern 
Nigeria; the Action Group in the West; the NEPU, the main opposition party 
Northern Nigeria; and the UMBC led by Mr. J. S. Tarka from the Tiv 
Division of Northern Nigeria. The sole basis of this alliance was to win 
the federal elections of 1964. 
On the other hand the second alliance was formed comprising the fol¬ 
lowing parties: The NPC, the ruling party in the Northern Region; the 
Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), the ruling party in the Western 
Region; the Midwest Democratic Front, the opposition party in the Mid¬ 
western Region; the Niger Delta Congress; the Dynamic Party, an Eastern 
Nigerian party; and the Lagos State United Front. It was called the 
Nigerian National Al 1iance (NNA). 
Elections which occasioned these plans and alliances were to be 
held on the federal level in December 1964 and in Western Region a year 
later. At first, UPGA anticipated victory, if electoral malpractice 
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could be kept down. However, victory in all three Southern regions (East, 
West, and Mid-West), was requisite for ousting the Northerners from con¬ 
trol of the Federal Government. But after observing several real and 
imagined abuses, UPGA ordered a boycott of the elections, because the 
regional governments were responsible for electoral machinery in their 
regions. The UPGA boycott was successfully carried out in most of their 
constituencies. In March 1965, the federal government held elections in 
those regions in spite of the boycott, but the UPGA leaders had successfully 
undercut any emotional support which might have been awarded the victors. 
Both the Yoruba and Ibo grew progressively more sullen during these events. 
But the outcome of the 1964 elections was the formation of a broad based 
government comprising all parties, with Northerners still in control. 
(e) The 1965 Western Election Crisis; The undermining of public 
confidence in the motives of the federal government was completed by the 
regional election which followed in the West in 1965- An NNDP victory, 
ow'■ "g heavily to the ability of the despised Akintola government to manipu¬ 
late electoral machinery, combined with falling cocoa prices to produce 
virtual chaos there by the year's end. Many lives and much property were 
lost in riots, and by December 1965 Nigeria was on the brink of collapse. 
Then on January 15, 1966 came the first coup, followed by the second one 
on July 29, 1966, and the third on July 29, 1975* 
3. The Civil War (July 1967—January 1970) 
The irony of the Nigerian civil war is that it was occasioned by the 
breakdown in the relations between the Ibos and the Hausas, the majority 
groups that governed Nigeria at the federal center from about 1954 to 1966 
—the whole span of the prewar political history in which Nigerians were 
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more or less in control of power. The antagonism of the Yoruba-AG against 
the Hausa-NPC, and the bold attempt by the Yoruba-AG to win over all the 
minority and marginal groups in Nigeria in the federal elections marked 
out the Yoruba-AG as a "dangerous" political party. 
Thus the incidents leading to the 1966 coup and counter-coup, and the 
civil war that followed was a result of a power struggle between the three 
majority groups in the country. The first coup took place on January 15, 
1966. On the evening of the second day, General Ironsi, the Commander of 
the ---ied Forces took control of the Federal Government and established his 
authority throughout the country. It was a blow which ended the civilian 
reg-'me but not the political difficulties besetting Nigeria. All the 
previous tensions persisted, despite the profession of good intensions 
or. the part of the military leaders. In the end all negotiations failed 
arena the military leaders, and Nigeria disintegrated. 
The coup of January 15, 1966 is, therefore, not merely the advent of 
nil-tary rule in Nigeria, it is also the beginning of a crisis far more 
acute, far less amenable to peaceful resolution than any previous crisis 
in Nigerian political history. The coup heralded a period of centraliza¬ 
tion under General Ironsi. This initial trend was sharply reversed by 
another coup on July 29, 1966 when Ironsi (an Ibo) was killed and General 
Gowon (a Northerner) became the head of state. During his regime, the 
country moved into a period of decentralization and dislocation. This 
second coup jolted the beliefs of many Nigerians in the future of their 
country as one nation. The massacre of thousands of Easterners, especially 
Ibos resident in the North, Lagos and West, and the division of Nigeria 
into twelve states on May 27, 1967 by General Gowon, had increased not 
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only bitterness but many other problems as well between the Federal Govern¬ 
ment and Eastern Region. 
Thus, the events in the North and East rendered constitutional talks 
impossible, faced with the mammoth task of caring for the flood of refugees 
who streamed into the East from all parts of Nigeria. Friction developed 
from time to time between the Federal Government and the Eastern Region. 
The military Governor of the region, Lt. Colonel Ojukwu ordered all non- 
Easterners to leave his region for their own safety, and refused to attend 
meetings in Lagos. 
The situation was worsened by the fact that Ojukwu saw no reason to 
recognize Gowon's authority. In retaliation against Ojukwu's appropria¬ 
tion of revenues, a postal blockade was declared against the East. The 
East increasingly felt itself to be a beleaguered state, and clamor for 
secession grew louder. On May 30, 1967 the former Eastern Region of 
Nigeria declared itself as an independent Republic of Biafra. The Federal 
Government at once declared war against the secessionist region from July 
6, ’9o7 til January 12, 1970. 
Whatever the outcome of the civil war, Nigeria has been born as a 
nation. The baptism of fire which many of its citizens have endured has 
strengthened their resolve to keep their nation strong and viable. 
Although there was consensus on the division of Nigeria into twelve 
states, yet there was strong demand for more states after the civil war. 
With the overthrow of General Gowon in a bloodless coup on July 29, 1975 
Nigeria was further divided into nineteen states by General Muhammed 
(Hausa). By February 13j 1976 Muhammed was killed in an abortive coup 
and his leadership was taken over by General Olusegun Obasanjo (Yoruba). 
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The creation of nineteen states in Nigeria has strengthened the 
Nigerian nation in three ways. First, it will reduce the number of people 
who feel neglected by the state capitals. Large populations will not feel 
left out. Second, since the states are now smaller, the Federal Government 
becomes more powerful. Third, the creation of states necessitate a new 
constitution which the first Republic avoided. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
National Integration and Political Stability 
So far we have been concerned with tribal division in Nigeria and 
we shall now turn to considering the question of national integration and 
political stability. 
The political structure of Nigeria changed on May 27, 1967 and again 
on February 3» 1976. There are now 19 states in the Federal set up: ten 
in the North, and 9 in the South, For the minority Nigerians, the exer¬ 
cise was a dream come true. But to the majority Nigerians (Ibo, Hausa 
and voruba), the late General Murtala Muhammed's decision for creation 
of states certainly crushed their ambitions of controlling Regional and 
Federal Governments forever. 
National integration has eluded Nigerians before and after inde¬ 
pendence. This had to do with imbalance in political representation and 
minority problems. First, it was the North fearing political domination 
by the South, and then the South fearing the North. However, the July 
29, 1975 coup in which the late General Muhammed became head of state 
may not have had similar political motivations as the first two coups of 
1966, because most of the coup leaders came from the North. 
On the other hand, the abortive coup of February 13, 1976 in which 
Muhammed died was apparently planned and executed by people from a par¬ 
ticular tribe in the Northern section of Nigeria (Tiv). 
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With the creation of 19 states,^ Nigeria must now be studied in a 
new light. Former provincial or divisional headquarters have suddenly 
become state capitals and before the end of the current development plan, 
more villages v/i11 have good roads, light and pipe-borne water, hospitals, 
schools and other rural development projects, in order to provide basic 
social amenities. 
The Federal Government should now see the need to concern itself 
with what the state governments have done in their rural areas. Any imbal 
arcs in distributing government-sponsored projects could then be spotted 
if crere is a national chart of all development areas. If the rural areas 
are developed, local businessmen may be attracted to invest there, thus 
creating job opportunities for those who might otherwise think that all 
is only well in urban centers. 
In part, the political dialogue of the 1970's seems to substantiate 
the country's hope for national parties. Though the ethnic underpinnings 
of political factionalism are still important, ideological consciousness 
and diversity are definitely emerging among Nigerian politicians, who will 
be the core of any future party system. 
Conclusion 
We have seen how urbanization and the migration of peoples have led 
to the awakening of political thoughts and consciousness and the develop¬ 
ment of nationalism in Nigeria. 
It has been the intellectual elite of the cities who have been the 
leaders of the nationalistic movements and the leaders of the political 
^Nigeria Year Book, Lagos, Time Press, 1970, p. 21. 
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parties. It seems very likely that the relatively large numbers of Ibos 
who have played a prominent role in the nationalist movement in Nigeria 
is the result of the rapid urbanization of the Ibo peoples in the Eastern 
Region and the large proportion of Ibos in the population of non-Ibo 
1 
cities. 
With the growth of urban centers, and the establishment of British 
administration over Nigeria, Western economic forces have profoundly 
changed both the structure of traditional Nigerian societies and the per¬ 
spective of Nigerian peoples. The tempo and character of changes created 
situations and attitudes that have predisposed many Nigerians to radical 
consciousness and nationalist activity. However, the formation of parties 
was based on regional divisions. 
The period after 1950 which witnessed the entrenchment of ethnic 
politics in Nigeria was, therefore, the most uninspiring in the history 
of the nationalist movement in the country. And were it not for the fact 
that there had already been a substantial movement towards freedom and 
that the complexities of international politics forced Britain to push 
forward with the policy of decolonization, it is doubtful whether Nigeria 
could have achieved her independence in I960. 
The federal arrangement under which Nigeria gained independence was 
conceived as a means of satisfying the desires of the country's three 
major ethnic groups to control their destinies while remaining part of a 
larger political unit. The political crisis during the life of the First 
Republic reflected the failure of the constitutional arrangements to 
See Table 3 "Degree of Ibo Urbanization Outside Iboland." 
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distribute political power in an acceptable manner. At the national level 
the Northern Region was able to dominate at the expense of the Eastern and 
Western Regions, while within the regions the minority ethnic groups com¬ 
plained bitterly about the predominance of the larger ethnic communities. 
If the current division of Nigeria into twelve states in 1967, and again 
into nineteen states in 1975 had come earlier, it probably would have 
reduced political instability and forestalled the secessionist war. 
Unfortunately, the inability to transcend ethnic loyalties in poli¬ 
tics has continued in the post-independence period. This factor, com¬ 
binée with corruption, selfishness, lack of idealism and the absence of 
a sourd, dynamic and disciplined leadership was responsible for plunging 
the country into civil war, 1967/70. 
rinally, having outlined the scale of ethnic differences in Nigeria, 
the .•-"iter feels obliged to offer some means of reducing the tensions. 
Tee structure of nineteen states has been lauded as a major step toward 
ensuring healthy ethnic relations, national integration, and national 
stecTity in Nigeria. But agitation for state creation in Nigeria has 
been intrinsically interwoven with the question of ethnic identity and 
fear and suspicion by the ethnic minorities of the major ethnic groups. 
As rightly remarked by Arikpo, "The minority problem, more than any other 
single political issue, was at the root of most of the friction between 
and within political parties, governments and administration since inde¬ 
pendence."^ Yet is is open to question whether any sound federation in 
^Okoi Arikpo, The Development of Modern Nigeria (Baltimore, 1967), 
p. 82. 
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Nigeria can be based solely on ethnic units or sub-divisions. Other 
factors, such as compactness of geographical area, administrative con¬ 
venience, the fact of history, the wishes of the people, political reali¬ 
ties, and the viability of the units, need be considered. Ethnicity 
should be one of the factors, but undue emphasis on it can contribute to 
considerable systemic stress. Dual loyalty is an aspect of federalism, 
but in a young federation like Nigeria the danger of ethnic loyalty pre¬ 
vailing over national loyalty is very real. And its results, as the civil 
war demonstrated, can be disastrous. 
Another critical factor in shaping ethnic relations in Nigeria has 
been the formula for revenue allocation among the various units of the 
fédération. The distribution of funds collected by the central govern¬ 
ment has always been a source of controversy among the units of the federa¬ 
tion, and no allocation formula has ever been universally acceptable. 
Revenue allocation in Nigeria has revolved around the four basic prin¬ 
ciples of need, derivation, independent revenue and national interest. 
However, for a revenue allocation formula to be realistic, it must be 
consistent with the character of the federation. 
The recent experience of a civil war has convinced most Nigerians 
of the need for unity among the new states. To achieve these twin object¬ 
ives, sufficient resources must be left to the center to give it strength, 




DEFINITIONS OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS1 
Tribe: Those people who have a common name for their language and feel 
themselves to be speaking the same language can be conveniently termed 
tribe, irrespective of political circumstances. It is the largest social 
group defined primarily in terms of kinship, and is normally the aggrega¬ 
tion of clans. 
Sub-tribe; Sub-divisions of the tribe may be termed sub-tribe if the 
difference in dialectal or geographical if it is in local groups. 
Net - -• : A large group of people who feel that they form a single and 
exclusive community destined to be an independent state. 
Nat:analism: An act of political consciousness or state of mind primarily 
concerned with achieving the independence of the country from foreign rule. 
Cof-rc -: : y : A human group of any size whose members have a consciousness of 
living a common life and sharing a common destiny. 
Nationalist movement: An association organized to achieve self-government 
for the people whom its members claim to represent. 
State: A territorial system having a single and self-sufficient legal 
order to maintain it. 
Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Development in Nigeria (Cambridge, I960), 
p. XIV. 
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Political Party: An association that competes with other similar associ¬ 
ations in periodic elections in order to participate in formal government 
institutions and thereby influence and control the personnel and policy 
of government. 
Society: A human aggregation whose members have become inter-independent 
through the exchange of goods and services, a division of labor and a 
network of relationships and interactions which distinguishes them as a 
group from other groups. 
Cl an : A group consisting of one or more extended families descended from 
one historical ancestor speaking the same language and dialect and observ¬ 
ing one common shrine. 
Association: A group of people united and organized for the purpose of 
pursuing a common interest, e.g., Political party, Tribal union and Clan 
meeting. 
Niaerian: An African irrespective of tribe or nationality, who is an 
indigene of Nigeria. 
African: A loose term used mainly by Europeans in referring to members 
of the Negro race, except those from the United States., who are called 
"American Negroes" or those from the West Indies, who are called "West 
Indians." 
European : A common term used by Africans to refer to any white person 
irrespective of nationality. 
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Race; It refers to a division of mankind distinguished by color of skin, 
stature, head and general physiognomy, e.g., Black race or white race. 
Abbreviations 
A.G. — Action Group 
N.P.C. — Northern Peoples Congress 
N.C.N.C. — National Council of Nigerian Citizens. 
U.M.3.C. — United Middle Belt Congress 
N.E.P.U. — Northern Elements' Progressive Union 
N.N-D.P. — Nigerian National Democratic Party 
U.P.G.A. — United Progressive Grand Alliance 
N.N.A. — Nigerian National Alliance 
The NCNC was formerly called "The National Council of Nigeria and 
the Cameroons, but when the Cameroons in 1961 ceased to be part of Nigeria 
the party became known as the "National Council of Nigerian Citizens, thus 
retaining the same initials. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aboyade, 0. "Industrial Location and Development Policy: The Nigeria 
Case." Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies 10, 3 
(November 1968). 
Anene, Joseph C. Southern Nigeria in Transition. London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966. 
Almond, Gabriel A., and Coleman, James S., eds. The Politics of the 
Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 
Ari<po, 0. The Development of Modern Nigeria. London: Penguin, 1967. 
Owo'owo, 0. Awo—The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. London: 
Cambridge University Press, I960. 
 . Path to Nigerian Freedom. London: Faber and Faber, 1947. 
 . The Strategy and Tactics of the Peoples Republic of Nigeria. 
New York: Macmillan, 1970. 
Azi<iwe, N. Renascent Africa, 1st. ed., 3rd impression. London: Cass, 
1968. 
 . The Development of Political Parties in Nigeria. London: 
University Press, 1957. 
Balewa, Sir A. T. Nigeria Speaks. Speeches Made Between 1957-1964. 
Longmans, Clarendon Press, 1964. 
Banton, Michael P. West African City. London: Oxford University Press, 
1957. 
Basccm, W. R. "Urbanization Among the Yoruba," The American Journal of 
Sociology 60 (March 1955). 
Busia, K. A. Report on a Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi. London: 
Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1951. 
Bradbury, R. E. The Benin Kingdom and the Edo Speaking Peoples of South 
western Nigeria. London: International Publications, 1964. 
Bretton, H. L. Power and Stability in Nigeria. New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1962. 
56 
57 
Caldwell, J. C., and Okonjo, C. The Population of Tropical Africa. 
London: Longmans Press, 1968. 
Carter, G., and Brown, W. 0. Transition in Africa: Studies in Political 
Adaptation. African Studies Program. Boston: Boston University 
Press, 1968. 
Cook, A. N. British Enterprise in Nigeria. Philadelphia: Littlefield 
and Adams, 1943* 
Cobban, Alfred. National Self-Determination. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1944. 
Coleman, James S. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966. 
Coleman, J. S., and Rosberg, C. G., Jr., eds. Political Parties and 
National Integration in Tropical Africa. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1966. 
Dav'tson, Basil. The Lost Cities of Africa. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1959. 
Dav4;, K. "The Origin and Growth of Urbanization in the World." American 
Journal of Sociology 60 (March 1955). 
D*‘<e, K. 0. Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885. London: 
Oxford At Clarendon Press, 1956. 
Du5ois,'W. E. B. The World and Africa. New York: Viking Press, 1947. 
Eli=s. T. 0. "Makers of Nigerian Law." West Africa, December 3? 1955- 
Eke. I. I. "Population of Nigeria: 1952-1965." The Nigerian Journal of 
Economic and Social Studies 8, 2 (July 1966). 
Ezera, K. Constitutional Developments in Nigeria. Cambridge: At the 
University Press, i960. 
 . "The Failure of (Nigeria) Federation and Proposed Constitu¬ 
tional." African Forum 11, 1 (Summer 1966). 
Flint, J. E. Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria. London: 
Oxford University Press, I960. 
Geary, W. N. M. Nigeria Under British Rule. London: Frank Case and 
Co., Ltd., 1927. 
Green, M. M. Ibo Village Affairs. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd., 
1947. 
Hance, W. A. Population, Migration and Urbanization in Africa. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1970. 
58 
Hanna, W. J., and Judith, L. Urban Dynamics in Black Africa. Chicago: 
AT dine, 1971• 
Hinden, Rita. Empire and After. London: Allen and Unwin, 19^+9• 
Hodgkin, T. L. Nationalism in Colonial Africa. London: Frederick Muller, 
1956. 
Huntington, S. P. Political Order in Changing Societies. Cambridge, Mass. 
Harvard University Press, 1968. 
Ikejiani, Okechuku, ed. Education and Tribalism: Education in Nigeria. 
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 
Ikeotuonye, V. C. Zik of Africa. London: Macmillan, 1961. 
Keay, E. A., and Thomas, H. West African Government. Ibadan: Caxton 
Press, 1965. 
Litt’e, Kenneth. "West African Urbanization as a Social Process." Cahiers 
d'Etudes Africaines 3 (October I960). 
Lloyd, P. C. The Ethnic Background to the Nigerian Crisis. London: Cam¬ 
bridge University Press, 1968. 
Lucard, F. D. Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. London: William 
31ackwood, 1923. 
Mabogunje, A. L. Urbanization in Nigeria. New York: Africana, 1968. 
Mumford, L. The City in History. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 
1961. 
Mackinton, J. P. Nigerian Government and Politics. London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1966. 
O'Connell, James. In African Integration and Disintegration, Arthur 
Hazlewood, ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. 
Olorunsola, Victor A. The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa. 
Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1972. 
Ottah, Nelson. "The Rise and Fall of Chief Awolowo." Drum, November, 
1963. 
Padmore, G. Africa: Britain's Third Empire. London: Dennis Dobson, 
1949. 
Rothchild, D. S. Toward Unity in Africa: A Study of Federation in 
British Africa. Washington: Public Affairs Press, I960. 
Schwarz, W. Nigeria. New York: Praeger, 1968. 
59 
Shafer, B. C. Nationalism: Myth and Reality. New York: Harcourt, 1955- 
Shepherd, C. W. The Politics of African Nationalism. New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1962. 
Sklar, R. L., and Whitaker, C. S. "The Federal Republic of Nigeria," In 
National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States, Gwendolyn 
Carter, ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966. 
Spengler, 0. The Decline of the West. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938. 
Talbot, P. A. The Peoples of Southern Nigeria. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1962. 
Tilman, R. 0., and Cole, T. The Nigerian Political Scene. Durham, N. C.: 
Duke University Press, 1972. 
Udo, K. The Geographic Regions of Nigeria. London: Heineman, 1970. 
Wirth, L. "The Urban Society and Civilization." American Journal of 
Sociology 45 (March 1940). 
 . "Urbanism as a Way of Life." American Journal of Sociology 
-5 (March 1938). 
Whe-rr, J. Nigerian Legislative Council. London: Faber and Faber, 1950. 
Periodicals, Newspapers and Articles 
Bulletin Census of- Nigeria, No. 5, Lagos, 1953- 
Constitution of the Nigerian National Democratic Party, Lagos, n.d. 
Daily Service, October 5» 1938. 
Federal Census of Nigeria, No. 5, Lagos, 1963- 
Historical Records of the Calabar Improvement League, Calabar, 1938. 
Legislative Council Debates, June 12, 1934. 
New Nigeria. 
Nigerian Advocate, August 15, 1923. 
Nigerian Year Book, Lagos, Times Press, 1970. 
Population Census of Western Region of Nigeria, Vol. IV, 1952. 
The British Problems in Africa, Foreign Affairs, July 29, 1951- 
60 
The Comet. 
The Daily Times. 
The Nigerian Chronicle. 
The Lagos Weekly Record. 
West African Pilot. 
